.Ill 

E 480 I 

R45 I REVIEW 

Copy 1 



HON. J. COLLAMEll'S SPEECH, 



IN THE SENATE, ON THE 16TH JANUARY 1865, 



THE BILL FOR THE REPEAL OF THE EIGHTH SECTION 

OF THE ACT OF JULY 2d, 1864, RESPECTING 

TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE 

REVOLTED STATES. 



W A S II I N G T N , D . C . : 

REOTYPER8. 
1865. 



EBYIEW 



HON. J. COLLAMER'S SPEECH, 



IN THE SENATE, ON THE 16TH JANUARY, 1865, 



ON 



THE BILL FOR THE REPEAL OF THE EIGHTH SECTION 

OF THE ACT OF JULY 2d, 1864, RESPECTING 

TRADE WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE 

REVOLTED STATES. 



r ,0 



WASHINGTON, D. C: 
MoOILL k WITUEROW, PRINTERS AND STEREOTYPERS 

1865. 




^_ 











*$* 



BETIEW 



HON. J. COLLAMER'S SPEECH. 



In presenting this bill, the distinguished Senator from 
Vermont expressed his idea of its vast importance in the 
most emphatic terms. He says: "I am entirely convinced 
in my own mind that unless this bill, or such a one as this 
in effect, be passed, we never shall subdue this insurrection, 
it never can be ended, it never will be ended. I regard it 
as the most important measure on which I have ever had 
occasion to speak in the Senate." 

It is apprehended that these expressions do not in the 
least magnify the importance of the bill in its relation to 
the results of the present war, and the weal of the country. 
It is proposed, however, to demonstrate that its importance 
rests in considerations quite opposed to those presented by the 
distinguished gentleman ; that it rests on the mischievous 
results which will attend its passage, and the happy conse- 
quences which must flow from its defeat. 

It may well be assumed, from the large experience and 
eminent ability of the distinguished Senator from Vermont, 
and from his estimate of the vast importance of the subject, 
that his speech presents, if not all, at least the leading and 
most potential arguments which may be adduced in favor 



of the bill ; and therefore we may safely examine the sup- 
posed merits of the bill, in the points presented by the 
gentleman, which are the following, viz : 

1st. The section sought to be repealed, and the policy 
based thereon, are opposed to an inherent law of war, and 
render all efforts to subdue the rebellion nugatory. 

2d. They defeat the objects of the blockade. 

3d. They defeat the blockade itself and end it. 

4th. They defeat the confiscation act. 

It is proposed to demonstrate, in the first place, the fallacy 
of each of these positions, examined in the light, of fact and 
law ; and in the second place, that the policy enunciated by 
the Government, and based on the 8th section of the act of 
July 2, 1864, or something at least as liberal, is the only 
policy which can bring us early success in completely sub- 
duing the rebellion, and maintaining throughout its entire 
domain the national integrity, and that prosperity and social 
order which every patriot must devoutly pray for. These 
two propositions being clearly demonstrated, it is appre- 
hended that no man in the country will come to their sup- 
port more heartily than the distinguished gentleman from 
Vermont. 

I. The distinguished gentleman asserts that it is an inhe- 
rent law of war — a law by the force of war itself — that war 
and trade cannot be carried on at the same time between 
belligerents. Of course he docs not iuteud to assert a phy- 
sical incompatibility, for manifestly there is none. 

The proposition is obviously this : that while carrying on 
a war we cannot trade with the people of the enemy's 
country without paralyzing the efforts of war and render- 
ing impossible the attainment of its objects. 

2s"ow let us see if this be true. In determining this, we 
must consider, 1st, how the trade to be carried on affects 
our financial strength and that of the enemy ; 2d, how it 
affects the^morale of ourselves and that of the enemy ; 3d, 
how it affects our wants and those of the enemy ; and 4th, 
how it affects our knowledge of the strength and movements 
of the enemy, and his knowledge of our strength and 






movements. If, in all these, the trade gives to us the 
decided advantage, the distinguished gentleman himself, it 
is believed, will be among the first to uphold and advance 
the trade policy of the Government. 

He estimates the quantity of cotton at four millions bales. 
There are, doubtless, that number of bales in the whole 
South, of the old and new crops. But it is believed that 
four millions is very largely an over estimate of the quantity 
which could be actually gotten into market, even under the 
most liberal policy. Two millions, or between two and 
three millions bales is as much as can be reasonably expected 
to be actually handled during the present year. If the dis- 
tinguished gentleman's estimate be correct, however, it will 
only serve to strengthen the view here expressed. 

Suppose the Government of the United States, under its 
present system of trade, brings into market two millions 
bales, averaging four hundred and fifty pounds per bale, 
making a total of nine hundred millions pounds: How will 
this quantity affect our revenue directly, and how will it 
impress our finances ? Our Government gets on this cotton, 
directly, in the shape of revenue, including duty and tax, 
thirty-one per cent of the New York net value of the cot- 
ton. Cotton being worth iu Xew York §1 15 per pound, 
and assuming 15 cents per pound, which is a very large es- 
timate, to cover costs of transportation, handling, and sale, 
there is left §1 per pound net, in New York, or thirty- 
one cents per pound of revenue to the Government, yielding 
in revenue on the nine hundred millions pounds the enor- 
mous SUm Of TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY MILLIONS OF DOL- 
LARS ! This is so much directly put into the treasury of the 
United States. 

Magnificent as this result of the trade is, it is yet insig- 
nificant as compared to the impression on our finances, as 
affecting exchange and the balance of trade. Nine hundred 
millions pounds of cotton in our hands for exportation, with 
the loss of three crops, creating a demand which inevitably 
must support prices, could not fail to create in our favor so 
enormous a balance of trade as to appreciate our currency, 



6 

as if by magic, to par with gold. Indeed, so patent is this, 
that during the gentleman's speech, one of his friends, [Mr. 
Foster,] as if to aid his argument, suggested that by the 
time the cotton got to New York, if enough were gotten 
there, the greenbacks paid the Southern producer would 
be equal to gold ! a fact which the distinguished gentleman 
could not but accept, without apparently, in the heat of dis- 
cussion, perceiving its tremendous effect against the argu- 
ment he was making. Is it not true, then, that as magnificent 
as is an increase of two hundred and seventy millions of 
revenue from the trade, yet that increase is overshadowed 
and dwindles in presence of the impression made upon our 
national finances, in the appreciation of our currency ? If 
the distinguished gentleman was right in assuming that 
financial strength constitutes "the sinews of war," and no 
sound thinker or enlightened reader of history doubts it for 
a moment, then indeed does this trade, successfully managed, 

give to US "THE SINEWS OF WAR." 

But, to be fair in this discussion, and to arrive at accurate 
and just conclusions, we must not forget to weigh the effects 
of this trade upon the Confederate finance. Let us assume 
the figures of the gentleman himself, (supposing the cotton 
to be paid for in our currency,) that the Southern pro- 
ducers or holders are paid fiftv cents per pound. This would 
make a total to the Southern people of four hundred and fifty 
million dollars in our currency. Of this four hundred and 
fifty millions, the people are compelled by the Confederate 
Government to pay into the Confederate treasury eight cents 
per pound on all cotton sold by them to us, making revenues 
directly from the sale of the nine hundred millions pounds, 
to them of seventy-two millions, against the revenue accru- 
ing to us of two hundred and seventy millions. But as as- 
tonishing as this difference is in our favor, it is as nothing 
compared with the immense difference in the impression 
made upon our and their finances. With us it creates a 
balance of trade in our favor of well on to a thousand mil- 
lions dollars. With them it is far different. They have 
transferred to us that which creates a balance of trade, and 



hold in its stead the four hundred and fifty millions dollars 
we have paid them for their cotton. From the pressure of 
their wants and the high price of goods, they will be com- 
pelled to expend the whole of this large amount, except the 
seventy-two millions taken by the Confederate Government, 
in purchasing of us the commodities they need. Thus they 
not only transfer to us their only basis of credit— the cot- 
ton—but return to us almost the entire sum we paid them 
for it, to the utter prostration of their credit and the para- 
lyzing of their finance. 

This is the most favorable view, for the distinguished gen- 
tleman's argument, to take of the financial effects to the 
South of this trade ; but it is not a sound view, because it 
is not the practical and matter-of-fact view. Practically and 
in fact, (as the regulations permit and the Southern people 
desire,) the cotton, to the extent of one-third of its value, 
would be paid for in goods. The people, so long accustomed 
to the most exorbitant prices, would regard goods sold them 
at a hundred per cent, profit as purchased at very reasonable 
and moderate prices. Assuming the New York net value 
of cotton, after paying all charges and expenses, to be $1 
per pound, the purchaser would be authorized to give goods 
to the extent of one-third of that amount at invoice prices 
for every pound bought ; but then he charges one hundred 
per cent, profit on his goods, and that enables him to pay 
the seller of cotton 66f cents on every pound of cotton in 
goods at selling rates. It must be manifest, then, that in- 
stead of paying them for their cotton in our currency, we 
pay them for it entirely in goods. Thus we not only 
get the cotton, without paying money, but reap the rich 
harvest of two hundred and twenty-five millions dollars in 
the shape of profits on the goods exchanged for it. 

What, then, have they gotten in lieu of what they have 
given ? They have perishable goods which will be worn out 
and gone in six or twelve months — goods which do not, to 
the extent of a single dollar, strengthen their credit or favor- 
ably impress their funds. What have we gotten ? that 
which, while they retained it, was a substantial basis of 



8 

credit to them, but which, transferred to to us, becomes a 
tower of financial strength, imparting stability, confidence, 
credit, and, as if by magic power, lifting our funds to par 
with gold. 

The distinguished gentleman proclaims that " cotton is 
king." If cotton is king, and we are unable to dethrone it, 
let us make it a tributary king, let us compel it to con- 
tribute strength to our financial system and help to furnish 
us with "the sinews of war." 

Taking the distinguished gentleman's estimate of the 
quantity of cotton, that is four instead of two millions bales, 
as correct, just doubles the force of this argument, while at 
the same time it must be apparent to every mind, pro- 
foundly examining this subject, that in assuming the im- 
mense financial results of this trade in favor of the South, 
which he mentions as eight hundred millions dollars, with 
no results favorable to us, the distinguished gentleman had 
failed to take into consideration the true elements of the 
question. 

Having demonstrated that the effect of this trade must 
essentially be the wonderfully strengthening of our finances 
and the disastrously weakening those of the enemy, it fol- 
lows that the carrying on of the trade by us is not opposed to 
the law of war; because, by its financial relations, it supports, 
reinforces and upholds all our military operations. As be- 
tween the belligerents themselves, w 7 here the rights of other 
nations are not involved, the sole criterion of the lawfulness of 
any policy is the advantage which results from it in impart- 
ing military strength and success to the power making use 
of it. 

Let us now take up the second element to be considered 
in determining whether this trade is incompatible with the 
carrying on of the war, is contrary to the laws of war, and 
inquire how the trade will affect the morale of ourselves and 
that of the enemy. If its tendency is to strengthen the de- 
termination of our people to prosecute the war to the entire 
suppression of the rebellion on the one hand, and on 
the other to weaken the zeal and ardor of the Confederates 



9 

in the prosecution of the rebellion, then, surely, it will not 
be contended that the trade is incompatible with the laws of 
war, inasmuch as it imparts strength and vigor to our mili- 
tary system and weakness to that of the enemy — and hence 
is clearly admissible to us. 

In this connection we must keep steadily in mind several 
great facts : 1st. That we vastly preponderate in numbers 
and in all the material resources of war; 2d. That the coun- 
try is so prosperous that everywhere, not contiguous to the 
theatre of war, the traveller in passing sees no indications 
to remind him, were he not otherwise advised of the fact, 
that the country is waging one of the most stupendous wars 
of the world; 3d. That abundance, to the extent of luxury, 
is ours in its usual profusion. 4th. That their country is 
desolated, impoverished, and in want ; that everywhere the 
ravages of war appear and the footsteps of the prowling 
conscriptor are heard. 5th. That our actual condition is stu- 
diously veiled by the Confederate authorities from the peo- 
ple, who are made to believe that we are exhausted in men 
and means and reduced to extremity like themselves ; and 
6th, that hatred towards us is studiously inculcated into 
their minds by their leaders. 

Under these circumstances, what must be the inevitable 
effect upon the Northern and the Southern mind of that 
coming together, and the exchange of facts and information, 
and the cultivation of kindlier sentiments, which the trade 
would necessarily bring about ? The Northern man thus 
learns the actual weakness of the South and spreads abroad 
the information through letters and travel ; and the Northern 
people, seeing what great things had been accomplished, are 
nerved with still stronger determination to carry the war to 
complete success. But the Southern man, coming with his 
products to trade, through the commerce of facts and infor- 
mation, learns our actual condition of strength and prosper- 
ity, is astonished at the contrast presented in his own region, 
and shocked at the deception he finds had been practiced 
upon him. Coupled with all this, the advantages flowing 
from this trade to him and his wife and his little ones, es- 



10 

pecially if he meets with reasonable consideration and kind- 
ness from the authorities, turn the tide of his animosity, 
and send it drifting back in the direction of friendly senti- 
ment. The tendency of all this is to sever the ties which 
bind him to the Confederacy — to reveal to him its hopeless 
weakness, and its inevitable doom. Such is the effect upon 
him ; but not upon him alone. On his return to his home 
he spreads the light among his neighbors — public sentiment 
becomes impressed — confidence in the Confederacy is lost — 
all heart is gone, and the way is gradually paved for the 
restoration of social order among these people, when the 
war shall end, and a present adverse sentiment engendered, 
aiding to bring the end about. To sum up this whole mat- 
ter, it must be apparent that the intercourse which this 
trade must produce could not fail to weaken the attachment 
of the Southern man to his government, from which he only 
experiences oppression ; while it would in the same propor- 
tion increase and strengthen that of the Northern people for 
their Government. It must take from the Southern mind 
the last vestige of hope for the success of the Confederacy, 
against such tremendous odds. It must bring them to con- 
trast their wretched condition with that of those who live 
and flourish under the protecting folds of the "old flag." 
Recipients, then, of kindness and benefits, kindlier senti- 
ments would spring up among them towards our people, and 
birth would be given to a desire of reuniting their destinies 
to those of the irrepressible and glorious Republic. Under 
these considerations, it cannot be doubted that the trade, 
wisely conducted, with a view to such results, could not fail 
to demoralize the rebellion speedily and surely. And thus 
the march of trade and commerce, though silent and unos- 
tentatious, would be more triumphant, and attended by more 
decisive and happier results to our cause, than the march of 
armies. 

Let us now pass to a consideration of the third element in 
this question, viz : How does such trade affect our wants 
and those of the enemy ? If the wants of the respective 
belligerents are such that the exchanges effected in fulfilling 



11 

them build up the one and impoverish the other, who will 
doubt but that the trade so resulting is an adjuvant of war 
to that one so built up, and should be employed, if possible, 
by it as a war measure. In the memorable contest between 
the English and Napoleon, it will be remembered that that 
sagacious statesman, as well as greatest soldier, conceived 
the vast design of combining the powers uf continental Eu- 
rope in the policy of non-intercourse with England. It was 
a master conception ; and had he been successful in indu- 
cing or compelling the combination, the results of that con- 
test must have been far different, and the supremacy of 
England checked if not destroyed. But what was the prin- 
ciple of that policy? — that trade with the people of the hostile 
country was incompatible with war ? Not at all ; for he was 
ever ready to trade with the people against whose govern- 
ment he waged war, when the general balance of advantage 
was decidedly in his favor and to his strength. The princi- 
ple was this : the peculiar power and vigor of the British 
monarchy rested then, as now, upon her manufactures and 
commerce. The proceeds of her mills and ships enriched her 
people, imparting to them prosperity and resulting ability to 
maintain with ease the most protracted and exhaustive war, 
while with the products of her looms she drained from con- 
tinental Europe its riches to pour them into her own lap and 
sustain her own enterprises. Her essential want was the mar- 
kets of the world. Through them she constrained the world to 
be tributary to her, and thus to sustain her vigor and power. 
While her system was exhausting other nations, it was building 
up and perpetuating her vastly preponderating financial 
strength and prosperity. Non-intercourse struck at the very 
roots of this policy, and if successful musthave undermined the 
power of Britain and brought her to terms. But its failure 
left that policy in full vigor, and England to grow rich and 
powerful — able to protract the struggle, and ultimately to 
triumph over her mighty foe. In this war we occupy pre- 
cisely the position England did in the wars of Napoleon, 
and the revolted States precisely that occupied by the con- 
tinental powers. Our wants are imperious, and being ful- 



12 

filled, give to us immense wealth, prosperity, and resulting 
strength. The wants of the revolted States are also impe- 
rious, but being fulfilled, yield them poverty and weakness. 
We have looms and operatives — we want cotton to work up ; 
if we cannot get it, our mills are closed up, our people 
starve, and the resources of the nation diminish ; give it to 
us, and proprietors and operatives are prosperous, and the 
country is opulent and powerful. We want cotton for export to 
increase our balance of trade and impress our finance ; give 
it to us and we can carry on this war indefinitely if neces- 
sary. Trade gives us this cotton in exchange for goods, 
realizing to us large profits on the goods, and thus making 
the cotton cheaper to us than to have produced it. "What 
then does the trade, based upon our wants, do for us ? It 
gives employment and supports industry ; it enables us to 
manufacture, and uot import our cotton goods ; it prevents 
the enormous drain upon our resources which importation 
would create; it yields us revenue counted by hundreds of 
millions ; it creates a balance of trade in our favor which 
relieves our finance from every embarrassment, imparting to 
it stability and strength, and lifting our funds to par with 
gold ; and it enables us to compel the enemy to become 
tributary to our power and prosperity. 

But how do the wants of the revolted people, when satis- 
fied, affect them ? They want goods and supplies which are 
speedily consumed in their use. These they get in exchange 
for their cotton. 'Not a farthing is added to their financial 
strength — not a farthing to their credit, while they transfer 
to us a solid basis of credit and financial power. The inev- 
itable consequence to them is exhaustion, impoverishment, 
paralysis. 

It may be well to advert here to that most remarkable 
passage of the distinguished Senator's speech, in which he 
expresses his conviction that the splendid results of our 
military operations, on the Mississippi, have been infinitely 
overbalanced by the ill effects of the limited trade carried 
on, by the President's authority, under the act of 1861. He 
says : " Upon the whole, the best information that we can 



13 

get of it is that so far from the acquisition of the Mississippi 
by us, obtained by much of skill and blood and treasure, 
resulting in benefit to our country and to our cause, it has, 

AFTER ALL, RESULTED IN FURNISHING SUPPORT TO THE EN- 
EMY AND RELIEF TO THEM INFINITELY MORE THAN IT HAS 
BEEN OF ADVANTAGE TO US." 

It is difficult, indeed, in view of the facts and principles 
involved, to conceive how so enlightened a gentleman, as 
the distinguished Senator from Vermont, could have suffered 
himself to be drawn into such entire and utter misappre- 
hension of a subject as is here presented. The only solu- 
tion which occurs to us is that he was misled by the letter 
of General Canby, forgetting, doubtless, that the profession 
of arms, and even high military position, do by no means 
imply any profound insight into questions which belong-to 
the statesman ; nay, more, that the combination of great 
military genius, in the same man, with that breadth, depth, 
and scope of intellect which make the statesman is exceed- 
ingly rare, but when found gives to the world a Caesar or a 
Napoleon. We have surely nothing to say derogatory of 
General Canby as a soldier. Certainly his campaign in the 
distant West was highly creditable. Whether he possesses 
the qualities of a great soldier in the field, the country will 
doubtless learn when opportunities shall have afforded him 
the means of demonstrating himself. But this much we do 
think his letter proves, that he will mislead all those who 
yield to his guidance in matters relating to sound policy 
and administration, not purely of a military character. 

Let us examine this singular proposition of the distin- 
guished Senator. The elements of the question are :— the 
measure of advantages which have resulted to us from the 
acquisition of the Mississippi, whether of a military or com- 
mercial character ; and the measure of disadvantage result- 
ing from it, in the shape of support and relief to the enemy. 
Take a survey of the military situation at the commence- 
ment of the campaigns for the " acquisition of the Missis- 
sippi." Grant, then a Brigadier General, was concentrating 
at Cairo, then our southernmost position. A powerful Con- 



14 

federate army occupied Columbus, in what was supposed 
an impregnable position, some twenty miles south of Cairo. 
That magnificent river — the ware internum of the valley — 
from Columbus to the Gulf, stretching a distance of a 
thousand miles, with all its tributaries south of the Ohio, 
together with those rich States reaching on the west to the 
Rio Grande and on the east to the Atlantic, was in the un- 
disputed possession and control of the Confederacy. These 
States, w r ith Virginia and North Carolina, presented one 
continuous domain, unitod under one de facto govern- 
ment — its territory unbroken — its communications perfect — 
its soil a stranger to the ravages of war. Such was the sit- 
uation then. The acquisition of the Mississippi was then 
the objective of these campaigns. By a masterly strategic 
movement Grant struck Donelson, and the sequence was, 
immediate or remote, that we got the Mississippi down to 
Helena, including the greater portion of Tennessee. Then 
followed Helena, opening to us the Mississippi as far as 
Vicksburg. New Orleans, in the meantime, had fallen to 
us, by a campaign projected from the East, and we con- 
trolled the Mississippi from its mouth as far up as Port Hud- 
son. Stili Grant was pressing on, with that invincible will 
which sooner or later overcomes all opposition, and at last 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson were subdued and the whole 
Mississippi is ours. The u Southern Confederacy" is irre- 
mediably cut in two, its parts dissevered, and its communi- 
cations lost. Louisiana reconstructs her government, abol- 
ishes her system of slavery, and knocks at the door of the 
National Government for readmission. Arkansas does the 
same, and Tennessee follows the noble example. Thus, not 
only was there an acquisition of the Mississippi, but also of 
the rich States which border her shores on the west and 
east with the exception of Mississippi. Memphis, Vicksburg, 
and New Orleans become the bases of operations now af- 
fecting the great issues of war, on the Atlantic coast and 
even in Virginia. In the order of cause and effect, the Mis- 
sissippi was first, then as its sequences in successive order, 
came Chattanooga, Atlanta, Savannah, and in the order of 



15 

sequences not yet fulfilled, Charleston and Richmond. So 
vast is the field of results hanging on the acquisition of the 
Mississippi, that the mind staggers in its attempt to gather 
them into one connected view, and to trace out the relations 
of that great campaign. We have read in history, with ad- 
miration, of those splendid campaigns of Cyrus, of Alexan- 
der, of Caesar, of Lucullus, of Pompey ; hut what were these, 
compared with the conquest of the Mississippi 'and its de- 
pendencies ? In grandeur, in extent, in results, some ful- 
filled and others yet to come, this conquest parallels the 
proudest of antiquity. Yet we are gravely told, by the dis- 
tinguished Senator, that the acquisition of the Mississippi 
"has resulted in furnishing support to the enemy and relief 
to them, infinitely more than it has been of advantage to 
us!" 

What was this wonderful support and relief? Let us as- 
sume, what every man, who has attentively noticed the cur- 
rent of things in the region west of the Mississippi, under- 
stands to be preposterous, that the entire trans-Mississippi 
Confederate army was thoroughly supplied, armed, and equip- 
ped from the trade permitted on the Mississippi, — nay, let us 
suppose this trade to have created and outfitted the entire 
Confederate army operating in that region. What does it 
amount to? What has that army accomplished, worthy to 
be mentioned in comparison with the splendid results which 
have followed, and are following, the conquest of the Mis- 
sissippi ? In the comparison, all the achievements of that 
army dwindled into absolute insignificance. How then, even 
on the absurd hypothesis that the trade made, armed, 
equipped, and supported that army, how can the statement be 
upheld that the advantages resulting to the enemy have been 
"infinitely" greater than to us, from the conquest of the 
Mississippi? 

The fact is that while the Confederate army got a portion 
of the supplies going into the country through this trade, 
that portion was small and insignificant ; because there were 
never permitted supplies enough to answer the actual neces- 
sities and wants of the people. But there was a source of 



16 

supply which is daily growing in magnitude and importance, 
through which the trans-Mississippi Confederate army has 
been able to obtain its supplies, viz : Matamoras and other 
points along the Eio Grande. 

I^ow let us for a moment consider the bearing of the 
trade on the Mississippi, in its relation to the prosperity of 
the country, and the successful prosecution of the war. It 
is estimated that for the last three years about two hundred 
thousand bales have come out annually through this channel. 
This has sufficed to keep our operatives employed, our 
mills running, and largely, if not entirely, to supply our home 
demand for cotton goods. In itself, the trade amounting 
to two hundred thousand bales does not seem to be a very 
large matter ; and yet it is believed that the absence of those 
two hundred thousand bales would have been so potential 
au element in the disturbance of our industry and finance as 
to have rendered it difficult, if not impossible, to have main- 
tained our credit, and greatly to have embarrassed the pros- 
ecution of the war. Let us suppose this trade on the Mis- 
sissippi, which the gentleman thinks was so detrimental to 
us, had not been permitted. Then we would either have 
had to stop our mills, or buy of England. The shutting 
out from trade of two hundred thousand bales, and we be- 
coming purchasers instead of exporters, would have im- 
pressed prices and ranged them high. In all probability 
prices would have ranged at $1 per pound in coin, the only 
thing with which, in that case, we could buy. This, it is evi- 
dent, would have created a drain upon our coin resources to 
the extent of ninety millions annually, or, for the three years, 

TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY MILLIONS IN GOLD ! That drain Upon 

us would have been absolutely necessary in placing us in the 
same situation, in respect to industry and supplies, in which 
we were placed by this Mississippi trade. Could we have 
stood that drain ? It must be obvious that such a draft upon 
our resources would have paralyzed our finance, and left us 
unable to protract the struggle. If this view of the case be 
sound, that trade which the gentleman so deprecates has 
operated to the salvation of our credit and finance, and 



afforded us the power of carrying on the war so successfully 
and gloriously to the present moment, with every prospect 
of early and complete success. It is true there may have 
been much of irregularity, much to be deprecated, much to 
be regretted, clinging to and following up this trade. But 
we are to judge it, in view of its grand features, purposes, 
and results, and not by a microscopic view of an excrescence 
which attaches here and there. It is no doubt true that 
Kirby Smith's army, to a certain extent, was benefitted by 
this trade. What of that ? The benefits to him, compared 
to the grand and saving results to us, are like friction to 
machinery — inseparably incidental to, but not staying its 
grand movements and mighty results. Will any man reject 
the steam engine, the locomotive — an iron thing of life and 
power — because of the friction inseparable from its action ? 
Those benefits, compared to our advantages, are like a small 
and almost imperceptible wart, growing on a face of heavenly 
beauty, mirroring a soul of angelic purity and sweetness. 
Shall the face, and the beauty, and the pure soul be rejected be- 
cause of the wart? If a trade which results in upholding our 
credit, our industry, our finances, imparting to us vigor and 
power for the prosecution of the war to a successful end, car- 
ries along with it as incidental to it, and inseparable from it, 
the clothing and feeding — nay, even the arming of Kirby 
Smith's army, the plainest dictates of right, reason, and 
common sense, urge its adoption by us. When the right 
time comes in our military combination seriously to ad- 
vance upon him, we expect to rout and destroy his army, 
however well he may be supplied. This we can accomplish ; 
but if we permit paralysis to come upon our finances, we 
will never go to meet him. 

We come now to consider the fourth and last element in 
determining whether trade with the revolted people is opposed 
to the inherent law of war, viz : how this trade affects the 
enemy and us in respect to information of numbers, posi- 
tions, movements, &c. 

The distinguished gentleman, after mentioning Beaufort, 
Memphis, and Pensacola, as designated points of purchase, 
2 



18 

says : " Of course the effect is to admit to these places, in 
our military possession, all the people of that country, and 
to allow them free intercourse to and from those places," 
* * * "so that you open your camps entirely to these yeo- 
pie." And this view is supported by the quotation from 
General Canby's letter, wherein he says of cotton specula- 
tors, " I have not sent an expedition into the enemy's lines 
without finding agents of this character in communication 
with the rebels, giving them information regarding our 
movements." He says it is to the interest of these men " to 
give information of every contemplated movement." That 
this should be a grave and serious argument against the 
policy of trade in the mind of the distinguished Senator, 
who is a statesman, but, I believe, making no pretension to 
experience in the camp, is not remarkable ; but it is not a 
little surprising to see it urged by a soldier of high rank and 
most responsible position, and is only accounted for as one 
of those statements which occasionally drop from a man, by 
inadvertence as it were, in a matter that has not seriously 
engaged his thought. 

The assumption that the trade exposes our armies neces- 
sarily to the inspection of the enemy is a misconception of 
the case. Let us take Memphis as an illustration for all 
the rest. It is assumed that the Southern people throng 
that city, as sellers of cotton and purchasers of supplies ; 
that they leave the city freighted with information for the 
enemy touching our position, movements, &c. Now, in the 
first place, there is not one in a thousand of these men who, 
if they were to try, could take back with them any valua- 
ble or accurate information about the army. Any one who 
has ever visited camps about a city understands this. The 
only danger would be that skillful spies would come in un- 
der pretence of trade. But there is no need of such pre- 
tence, for the river front is open to the ingress of all. Any- 
body can gain access in that way, and, being there, can have 
access to the camps. Again, the closing of the lines oper- 
ates, practically, to exclude the honest and well disposed from 
ingress, while the accomplished spy, through his art and 



19 

canning, can always, by one means and another, gain admis- 
sion. The man who honestly approaches the city, friendly 
it may be to us, has no motives to prompt him, nor skill to 
enable him, to overcome the obstacles he meets at the picket 
line. He turns back, but the spy enters. What is the re- 
sult? We are cut oft' from all the information of the enemy's 
movements fifty or a hundred miles distant which well-dis- 
posed persons would otherwise bring us, while we do not es- 
cape ourselves the scrutiny of the enemy. An instance illus- 
trative of this point has just been related to me by a gentleman 
of high character from Memphis. "Not long since a gentleman, 
most friendly to us, approached the picket line with a few 
bales of cotton. He was not permitted to enter, and was 
turned back. Subsequently it was ascertained that he had 
information to impart which, in the expression of an experi- 
enced military man, would have been "worth more than a 
regiment." 

The fact is, that in all our camps about the cities we are 
closely scrutinized, and there is no escape from it. The 
military man who supposes he can escape this, humbugs 
himself. The fact of trade or no trade will scarcely 
make an appreciable difference. This has been so since war 
has been waged, and will be so as long as there are armies. 
The experienced leader of an army understands and appre- 
ciates this fact, and instead of trusting, too largely, in the 
vain effort to be safe from observation by excluding the 
possibility of the access of spies, he trusts to other meas- 
ures. He organizes his own spy system, and puts it on the 
most efficient footing possible to enable him to keep 
thoroughly and accurately advised of the strength, position, 
and contemplated movements, of the enemy, while he so 
conducts his own affairs as to leave for observation the l'east 
possible traces of what he intends to do, and at the same time, 
by his detective system, he renders observation of his camps 
dangerous and difficult. Were it not far wiser that a mili- 
tary leader form his plans and combinations and lock them in 
his own bosom until the time arrives for their development? 
Then there would be no information given of "contemplated 



20 

movements." Holding the army in thorough discipline, 
and at all times in readiness to move at the shortest possible 
notice, such a general confounds the spies by his reticence 
and thorough discipline, and his blows are struck ere those 
who would give information know where they are to fall. 
He who makes himself transparent, or who fails to hold his 
army compactly in hand and ever in readiness, whatever 
precautions he may take to keep spies out, will be an open 
book to the enemy, and may expect every movemeut to be 
more or less anticipated. Trade never, has and never will 
have any appreciable effect in bringing about or varying 
these results. 

Again, the camps are. and ought to be, on the outskirts 
of the city, ranging from a mile and a half to two miles out. 
Those coming to the city to trade would never see them, 
and certainly would not approach them on any legitimate 
trade business. The prompt arrest of those who should ap- 
proach the camps under suspicious circumstances, would 
soon put an end to curiosity, and render the camps as per- 
fectly safe from observation as they could be made were no 
trade being carried on. 

From the above considerations, and in whatever aspect 
the question is viewed, it appears that the advantages result- 
ing to us, from the proposed trade, are great and decided, 
imparting strength and stability to our finances, paralysis to 
those of the enemy — vigor and confidence to us, weakness 
and distrust to them — to us triumph, to them defeat ; there- 
fore this trade, so far from being opposed to the laws of war, 
is itself the chief support and reinforcement of the war. 

II. The second position taken by the distinguished Sen- 
ator is, that for us to trade with the people of the revolted 
States operates to defeat the objects of the blockade. 

Now, what are the objects of the blockade ? Obviously 
to prevent commercial intercourse between the people of the 
revolted States and foreign nations. The purposes accom- 
plished by this restraint are several : 1st. It prevents the 
ingress of arms and munitions of war; the material and ma- 
chinery for the construction, equipment, and outfit of ships 



21 

and vessels; the possibility of transporting the hostile armies 
from point to point by sea ; the importation of railroad iron and 
machinery for building, equipping, and repairing railroads; 
and material and machinery for the manufacture of guns and 
munitions of war. 2d. To prevent that financial strength 
accruing to those States which would have resulted from 
foreign trade. Under a wise administration of such trade, 
restricting importations to the actual necessities of the coun- 
try, and receiving gold in exchange for cotton, the finances 
of the revolted States would have been as favorably and as 
potentially impressed, as it has been above shown ours will 
be by the trade which this 8th section of the act authorizes. 
Such being the confessed objects of the blockade, it is 
difficult to perceive upon what principle the proposed trade 
would defeat those objects — inasmuch as those objects are 
left entirely operative, and unaffected by such trade. 

III. The third and most important position taken by the 
distinguished Senator now claims attention. This position 
is, that for our Government to permit the trade, contem- 
plated by this 8th section of the act, aud by the Executive 
order providiug for its execution, does, in effect, render the 
blockade unlawful, and end it. 

It is proposed to demonstrate, both in principle and on 
authority, that this position is wholly and entirely unsound. 

The authority quoted by the distinguished gentleman, 
from Dean, on war and neutrals, is undisputed, and its gen- 
eral statement of the law of blockade is undoubtedly cor- 
rect. But it has no application to the case under discussion. 
It consists of two distinct and independent statements of 
law. 1st. That " all blockade, which excludes the subjects 
of all other countries from trading with the ports of the 
enemy, and at the same time permits a general access to 

THOSE PORTS TO THE SUBJECTS OF THE STATE WHICH IMPOSES IT, 

is irregular, illegal, and null." Waiving, for the present, 
the great fact that the blockaded ports are our own ports 
and not foreign ports, and the questions of law which spring 
out of that fact, must it not be clear that unless the pro- 
posed trade involves "a general access " of our people to 



22 

the blockaded ports, this statement of the law can have no 
application whatever to that trade ? But the 8th section of 
the act of July 2, 1864, does not involve any such access; 
nor do the Treasury regulations made in pursuance of that 
section, and approved by the President, involve such access; 
but, on the contrary, in locating all the points of purchase at 
places other than such blockaded ports, these regulations 

ARE CONCLUSIVE THAT NO SUCH ACCESS IS PERMITTED. This 

disposes of the first clause of the authority quoted by the 
distinguished gentleman. He seems, however, not to have 
relied on this clause, and the rule of law therein stated, but 
wholly on the second clause, viz : " All blockade being for 

THE PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY for the 

private advantage of the State imposing it, would be void 
on the very principles on which the right of blockade is 
formed." Still waiving, for the present, the fact that the 
blockaded ports are our own ports, let us see if this is not 
as clearly inapplicable to the proposed trade and its legal 
effect on the blockade as the 1st clause of the distinguished 
gentleman's quotation. According to this statement of the 
law, the lawfulness of a blockade, imposed by one nation on 
the ports of another, depends upon the object of the 
blockade. If this object be lawful, under the law of na- 
tions, the blockade is lawful. And this is true, notwith- 
standing the situation and geographical relations of the 
belligerent nations may be such that, as an incident of the 
blockade, a monopoly of trade may spring up under it, 
accruing to the nation imposing it. To determine, therefore, 
the lawful, or unlawful character of the blockade, the inquiry 
must be confined solely and exclusively to the object of its 
imposition. If that object be the obtaining " a commercial 
monopoly for the private advantage of the State imposing 
it," the blockade is unlawful beyond any dispute. Because, 
by the law of nations, all nations are equally entitled to 
trade with any nation willing to trade with them, except so 
far as their rights of commerce are restrained by a blockade, 
legitimately imposed in accordance with the rules of war — 
that is, a blockade imposed by one belligerent nation upon 






23 

the ports of another, to enable it to accomplish the ends of 
war. And hence, to impose a blockade for any other pur- 
pose, is to injure the rights of neutrals, and gives rise to just 
cause of war against the State imposing it. This is the 
principle. Now the distinguished Senator has himself stated 
the objects for which this blockade was imposed, viz : to cut 
off all trade with foreign nations, and thus aid in accom- 
plishing the ends of the war by weakening the war power of 
the enemy, in preventing the supply to him of the material 
and machinery of war, and that immense acquisition of 
financial strength which would inevitably result from foreign 
trade. But this is not all ; if such be not the object of the 
blockade, then all argument on the question (on the hypoth- 
esis that the blockaded ports are foreign ports) is useless and 
futile. Because, in that case, the blockade is, and always 
has been unlawful and void, without any reference whatever 
to the legal effect of the proposed trade. The mistake of 
the distinguished gentleman's argument, is his failure to 
discriminate between that which is the incident merely, and 
that which, is the object of the blockade. All nations would 
have just cause of war against us for blockading those 
ports, if they were foreign ports, for the purpose of creating 
a commercial monopoly for our private advantage. But no 
such right of war accrues to them, if we have imposed the 
blockade for a legitimate and lawful object, notwithstanding, 
owing to the peculiar geographical relations of the belliger- 
ents, a monopoly of trade accrues to us, as an incident to, 
but not a purpose of, the blockade. 

To illustrate this view, let us take the case of Spain and 
Portugal. Let us suppose them at war, and Spain for a 
lawful object to have blockaded the ports of Portugal. Their 
geographical relations are such that trade might be car- 
ried on between them, across their land frontiers, without in 
any manner disturbing the blockade or touching the block- 
aded ports. Spain might discover that such trade would 
reinforce her war vigor aud powerfully aid in accomplishing 
the ends of the war — it would create in her behalf a mono- 
poly of trade. But that monopoly, being an incident merely 



24 

and not the object of the blockade, could not in any man- 
ner affect its lawful character. 

If any one doubts this proposition, let him consider 
whether the continuance of the lawfully imposed blockade 
by Spain, at the same time that she enjoys this incidental 
monopoly of trade, would constitute, in behalf of neutrals, 
a just cause of war against her ; because that is the criterion 
of judgment as to whether the conduct of one nation towards 
another, is lawful or unlawful. 

Vattel clearly lays down the law on this subject; he says: 
" The right of employing force or of making war belongs 
to natious no farther than is necessary for their own de- 
fence and the maintenance of their rights. Now if any one 
attacks a nation or violates her perfect rights he does her an 
injury. Then, and not till then, that nation has the right 
to repel the aggressor and reduce him to reason." * * * 
"Let us then say, in general, the foundation or cause of 
every just war is iwjury, either already done or threatened." 
* * * t( When, therefore, we would judge whether a 
war be just, we must consider whether 'he who undertakes 
it has in fact received an injury, or whether he be really 
threatened with one, and, in order to determine what is to 
be considered as an injury, we must be acquainted with a 
nation's rights, so called — that is to say, her perfect 
rights." * * * " Whatever strikes at these rights 
is an injury and a just cause of war." "If a nation takes 
up arms when she has received no injury, nor is threatened 
with any, she undertakes an unjust war." Vattel's Law of 
Nations, Book III, page 302. 

It is clear from the above authority that the conduct of a 
nation must inflict "injury" upon the "rights" of another 
to constitute that conduct unlawful, as being just cause of 
war. The two essential elements in that which constitutes 
just cause of war, therefore, are "rights," and "injury" in- 
flicted on those " rights." But it is very clear there can 
be no possible injury to rights where no rights exist. 
Such is precisely the case here. It is conceded that every 
nation has the " right" to trade with every other nation de- 



25 

siring such trade, in time of peace, and equally so in every- 
thing not contraband of war, in time of war, except at and 
through blockaded ports, where the blockade has been imposed for 
a lawful object The exception here stated no lawyer or 
sound thinker will for a moment doubt. But the exception 
covers the whole question ; for the blockade being lawful 
in its objects, intervenes and destroys the " rights " to trade 
through those ports which neutrals would otherwise enjoy. 
Those rights no longer exist under the law of nations ; and 
therefore, having no legal existence, could not be the sub- 
ject of injury. The supposed case of Spain is our actual 
case. Our blockade is lawfully imposed, and so recognized 
by all foreign Powers. It has in its legal operation annulled 
and destroyed all foreign rights of commerce there. Such 
rights no longer exist, and, not existing, cannot be injured 
by us, either through trade or otherwise. Trade, therefore, 
is beyond all question lawful to us, provided only we do not 
conduct it through the blockaded ports, and this our geo- 
graphical relations enable us to avoid. 

So far the discussion has proceeded on the hypothesis, 
assumed for the sake of the argument, that the blockaded 
ports are foreign ports — ports belonging to an independent 
nation, with which we happen to be carrying on war. But 
the fact is that these are our own ports. In legal contem- 
plation, the acts of the various assemblies and conventions, 
declaring the separation of the insurrectionary States from 
the nation, were mere nullities, and could have no such legal 
operation as was intended by them. These acts, and others 
which accompanied or followed them, and the taking up of 
arms by the people, imparted to those States the character 
of belligerent and revolted States, but did not sever them 
from the nation. 

On these facts arise two views of the question : the one 
touching our rights respecting trade with foreign nations at 
those ports which are now blockaded, as those rights would 
exist if the country were in profound peace, and the other, 
touching our right to regulate, permit, or prohibit all for- 



26 

eign trade at the ports of States belonging to the nation, but 
in actual revolt against her authority. 

The first of these views is this, that in time of peace, and 
much more in time of war, every nation has the undoubted 
right to disallow any and all commerce between herself and 
foreign nations, if in her own judgment she deems it to her 
advantage and safety. Japan exercised this right for centu- 
ries, and unquestioned by any nation. Yattel lays down 
the doctrine thus : " Since, then, a nation cannot have a nat- 
ural right to sell her merchandises to another that is unwil- 
lingto purchase them, since she has only an imperfect right 
to buy what she wants of others, it belongs to these last to 
judge whether it be proper for them to sell or not ; and 
finally, since commerce consists in mutually buying and sell- 
ing all sorts of commodities, it is evident that it depends on 
the will of any nation to carry on commerce with another, 
or to let it alone. If she be willing to allow this to one, it 
depends on the nation to permit it under such conditions as 
she shall think proper." (Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 39.) 
A nation, then, may decline all trade, or if she choose to 
permit some, she may "permit it under such conditions as 
she shall think proper." That is precisely what Japan is 
doing to-day. It must be clear, therefore, from the above 
authority, that the United States, did her interests and safety 
dictate to her such a course, and were she in a state of pro- 
found peace, would have the undoubted right, as between 
herself and foreign nations, to prohibit all foreign commerce 
at and through any of her ports, which she might designate, 
and open to trade such others as she might desire — and this 
without giving any offence or just cause of war to foreign 
nations. Not only so, but when she has laid a prohibition 
upon such trade, at any particular port or ports, "any viola- 
tion OF it in general subjects the ship and goods to 
seizure and confiscation, as in case of smuggling, whether 
by exporting or importing prohibited goods." (See Yattel, 
p. 38 and note 37, and the authorities there cited.) 

Since, therefore, as clearly appears from the above author- 



27 

ities, even though there were no war, we would have the 
lawful right to close those very ports against all foreign trade, 
whether impelled by motives of interest or of safety, it follows 
that the blockade is the mere assertion of, and the instru- 
ment for, the enforcement of a perfect right which we pos- 
sessed before — a right which we might lawfully assert against 
those violating it, with or without a blockade. Kow, the 
important legal consequence deduced from all this is, that 
our blockade does not depend for its lawful character upon 
the object aud purpose of its imposition, or upon the fact of 
war — but on the right belonging to every nation, whether in 
time of war or peace, to determine the conditions under 
which and the ports at which other nations may trade with 
her. And, hence, for us to carry on trade, whether in peace 
or war, with the people of the States in which the blockaded 
ports are located, would, constitute no violation of our block- 
ade — nay, more, that a trade by us, through those very ports, 
with the people of those States, would be lawful, and consti- 
tute no violation of our blockade. 

The other of the two views above adverted to, is this, that 
under the law of nations, all commercial intercourse what- 
ever, hy foreign nations, with a revolted State, before its 
separate independence has been acknowledged, is illegal. Vat- 
tel states the doctrine, rather obscurely it is true, for so per- 
spicuous a writer, in these words : " And since the perfec- 
tion of a nation consists in her aptitude to attain the end of 
civil society and the perfection of her condition, in not 
wanting any of the things necessary to that end, no nation 
ought to hinder another from attaining the end of civil 
society or to render her incapable of attaining it. The gen- 
eral principle forbids nations to practice any evil mano3uvres, 
tending to create disturbance in another State, to foment 
discord, to corrupt its citizens, to alienate its allies, to raise 
enemies against it, to tarnish its glory, and to deprive it of 
its natural advantages." (Yattel's Law of Nations, p. 142.) 
The doctrine is much more clearly and emphatically enun- 
ciated by Mr. Chitty, who is of equally great authority as 
Vattel himself, in his note to the above, in which he says : 



28 

"An instance of this rale is, the illegality of any commer- 
cial intercourse with a revolted colony before its separate 
independence has been acknowledged." See this note and 
the authorities there cited. Commercial intercourse with 
revolted States, therefore, being illegal, the attempt at it 
would draw upon the ships and goods the penalty of illegal 
acts, viz : seizure and confiscation. In this view of the case, 
again, the blockade becomes the instrument of vindicat- 
ing the law of nations in our behalf, and of supporting our 
right to prevent such commercial intercourse, and is not 
itself the foundation of that right. And hence, again, it 
follows that we may lawfully trade with the people of the 
revolted States, while we ourselves, by means of the block- 
ade, enforce the law of nations which prohibits foreign 
trade with them. 

Thus it appears, in view of the fact that the blockaded 
ports are our own ports, not only that the proposed trade, 
which does not involve any access by our people for com- 
mercial purposes to those ports, is lawful, and therefore does 
not reflect any unlawful character on our blockade, but that 
we have the right, under the law of nations, to monopolize 
that trade and to carry it on through those very ports, while 
at the same time, by our blockade, we enforce the non- 
intercourse of other nations with the revolted States in 
which those ports are situate. And such being our mani- 
fest right, its exercise could not give lawful offence to neu- 
trals, would not constitute just cause of war, would not be 
unlawful, would not end the blockade. 

IV. This brings us to the fourth and last point made by 
the distinguished Senator, viz : that the trade would practi- 
cally defeat the confiscation act. 

The reply to this position is, that if more important con- 
sequences, if far greater advantages result to the United 
States from the operation of the trade policy of the Gov- 
ernment, under the act of July 2, 1864, than from such par- 
tial execution of the confiscation act as is alone practicable, 
we should not hesitate to uphold that policy and give to it 
the fullest possible operation. 



29 

It seems indeed to be a law of nature that all great ad- 
vantages must be attended by certain disadvantages. This 
law impresses itself everywhere upon human enterprises. 
We trace it in mechanics, where splendid results are attained 
only with the outlay of immense power in friction. We 
behold it in commerce, where the rewards of successful ad- 
venture, which come back to enrich the merchant and ren- 
der opulent the State, are possible only by the vast outlay 
of means and through eminent risks. The statesman who 
does not recognize this law, in determining what line of 
policy he shall support, needs yet to learn some of the first 
principles which underlie his calling. 

Now the confiscation act, so far as it takes effect on the 
property affected by the proposed trade, is manifestly capa- 
ble of only a very partial practical execution. When it 
shall have been seen by the Southern people, that the settled 
policy of our Government will be to confiscate their pro- 
ducts as our armies subdue the country, having no hope left 
them, exasperated by the idea of being stripped of every- 
thing, they will commit to the flames all these products as 
far as possible for them to do it. 

The gentleman sees scattered through the South "four 
million bales," worth "eight hundred million dollars." 
Through confiscation, he would reach forth the right hand 
of the Government to grasp this cotton and seize this splen- 
did prize ; but when he wakes from his dream he will find 
that ashes alone are in the hand of seizure — his eight 
hundred millions dollars have melted into smoke and van- 
ished away. To afford to those people, then, no escape from 
confiscation and from utter ruin and want, is itself the most 
complete and effectual method of defeating the act and all 
its revenue objects. But the trade policy of the Govern- 
ment steps in, and discovers to those people a means of es- 
cape from this all-destroying act. They can sell their cot- 
ton to the Government itself. The cotton, instead of being 
turned into ashes, is turned over to us to augment the reve- 
nues, to enrich our people, to impress our fiuauce, and, in a 
word, to give to us all those splendid results which, as has 



30 

been demonstrated in another place, must flow to us from 
the proposed trade. 

But what will be the effect of such relief from confisca- 
cation upon the morale of the rebellion ? Confiscation 
thoroughly enforced reduces the entire population to abject 
penury and want, to such wretchedness as no human strength 
can bear, and so completely shuts out hope for the future 
that every man would consider death for himself and his 
family a boon most devoutly to be desired, in contrast with 
such wretchedness. Who does not see that, with this condi- 
tion of surrender before them, the people would forget every 
other thought but the thought of resistance? and who does 
not also see that resistance, thus begotten of the complete 
despair of a whole people, must needs be unto death, and. 
draw to itself a vigor and endurance, a multiplying of its 
normal power, such as at the least to protract the struggle 
for years ? In this event the cost to the nation of thus pro- 
tracting the war would be many times greater than the 
value, in cash to-day, of the distinguished gentleman's "four 
millions bales." 

On the other hand, give the people to feel secure in their 
property ; to be assured that as our armies advance and 
their country falls within our lines, that they can sell their 
products to us ; that they will not be stripped, ruined, utterly 
destroyed by us, but protected in their rights of property 
and afforded a market, and the moral effects upon them 
will be quite the opposite to those above delineated. Dis- 
armed of their hatred by what appears to them a just course 
on our part, their interests being now involved in our suc- 
cess — our early occupation of their country being now their 
salvation instead of their ruin — they hail with joy our 
approach. Public sentiment drifts against the Confederate 
rulers, every embarrassment is thrown in their way, and 
finally the Confederate arm is paralyzed, and trade has led 
the triumph of armies. 

Since penning the above paragraphs, I have read in the 
Baltimore Daily Gazette of to-day, (Jan. 25,) an extract 
from the Richmond Dispatch of J 'an. 19, which contains a par- 



31 

agraph remarkably illustrative of the view above expressed, 
that the cutting off of all hope from the Southern people, 
by the rigorous enforcement of the confiscation act, tends to 
arouse the entire population to the most determined and 
protracted resistance. The confiscation of all the cotton 
found in Savannah doubtless gave rise to the suggestions it 
contains. The paragraph is this : " Our only hope for any- 
thing is in the success of our struggle. Those who are sac- 
rificing Confederate securities for any other forms of prop- 
erty, with any idea of thus avoiding the hazards of the 
contest, are exhibiting an ignorance and a folly that sur- 
passes even their cowardice. We must fight the battle 
through and must win it, or all is lost. It would be wise in 
us to give a fourth or a half, nay, the whole, in taxation or 
gifts, rather than be conquered, for in that case we would 
lose all, and our liberties besides." What a tremendous 
argument is here furnished the leaders of rebellion to wield 
against us, in rousing to the last degree of desperation the 
entire population of the South, and bringing them to glory 
in sacrificing everything, both property and life, in their 
unholy cause ! 

The conduct of the great Themistocles, after the battle of 
Salamis, presents us a noble example, whose lesson we should 
not fail to heed. He had achieved a complete and splendid 
triumph over the Persian fieet, destroying the greater part 
and putting the rest to flight. The Persian monarch fled in 
dismay from Greece, carrying the bulk of his army with 
him. The Greeks insisted upon seizing the only avenue 
left for the escape of the remnant which had been left 
behind, and which, though dispirited and panic-stricken, was 
numerous, with a view to cutting off its retreat, and to its 
total destruction. But Themistocles refused to do it, insist- 
ing that the true policy was to leave open a channel of 
escape, lest, by cutting off that possibility, the Persians, con- 
centrated, reorganized, and nerved with the motive of 
despair, should become tenfold more vigorous than they 
were before, and the tide of success thereby turned iu their 
favor. His wise counsels prevailed ; the Persian army 



32 

escaped, and the tide of war which threatened to inundate 
and overwhelm his country was rolled back upon the aggres- 
sor. 

There is another view of the case which our Government 
should not fail to consider, viz : that, under the law of na- 
tions, a war which in its beginning is unjust and unwar- 
rantable, may, by the extreme objects and purposes of the 
opposing belligerents, become just and command the sym- 
pathies and assistance of the world. We have the undoubted 
right to wage this war with whatever vigor and energy we 
possess, and it is our highest duty to do so, to the entire and 
complete suppression of the rebellion, and the maintenance 
of the national integrity. But when we push our claims 
beyond that, when we are not content to accomplish this 
legitimate purpose, but insist upon the ruin and destruction 
of the whole of the belligerent people, by stripping them of 
everything they possess after they shall have surrendered 
to us, and casting them adrift, pennyless and beggars, with- 
out a ray of hope to sustain them, the war on their part 
changes from its original, unholy, and unjust character, to 
a war for self-preservation, which the law of nations recog- 
nizes as just, and which could not fail sooner or later to 
obtain the intervention of foreign powers. Yattel states the 
doctrine thus: " Justum est bellum, quibus necessarium; et 
pia arma, quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur sjoes" and cites 
the case of the Samnites, who, "instigated by the ambition 
of their chiefs, had ravaged the lauds of the allies of Rome. 
When they became sensible of their misconduct, they 
offered full reparation for the damages, with every reasona- 
ble satisfaction ; but all their submissions could not ap- 
pease the Romans; whereupon Caius Pontius, general of the 
Samnites, said to his men, ' Since the Romans are abso- 
lutely determined on war, necessity justifies it on our side ; 

AN APPEAL TO ARMS BECOMES LAWFUL ON THE PART OF THOSE 
WHO ARE DEPRIVED OF EVERY OTHER RESOURCE.' ' (Vattel's 

Law of Nations, p. 305.) 

But why should any statesman or patriot insist upon or 
desire the rigorous enforcement of the act of confiscation, 



33 

either pending the war or after the South shall have yielded? 
That distinguished leader of our armies, Major General W. 
T. Sherman, does not desire it, as fully appears by his or- 
ders and letters. The President of the United States, hold- 
ing the unbounded confidence of the nation, does not desire 
it, as evidenced by his proclamation of amnesty and pardon. 
It is opposed by that moderation which becomes a wise and 
magnanimous people, and no less by the maxims of national 
law. Says Vattel : " Sound policy and humanity are in 
perfect accord. What fidelity, what assistance, can you ex- 
pect from an oppressed people ? Do you wish that your 
conquest may prove a real addition to your strength, and be 
well affected to you? — treat it as a father, as a true sover- 
eign." He then adds that he is charmed with the answer 
of the ambassador from Privernum, who, in the Roman 
Senate, being asked " If we show you clemency, what de- 
pendence can we have on the peace you are come to sue 
for?" answered, " If you granted it on reasonable conditions 
it will be safe and permanent, otherwise it will not last long;" 
and, says Vattel, "Some took offence at the boldness of his 
speech ; but the more sensible part of the Senate approved 
of the Privernian's answer. * * * ' Can it be im- 
agined, (said those wise Senators,) that any nation, or even 
any individual, will longer continue in an irksome and 
disagreeable condition, than while compelled to submit to 
it ? If those to whom you give peace receive it voluntarily, 
it may be relied on. What fidelity can you hope from those 
you wish to reduce to slavery ?' * The most secure domin- 
ion,' said Camillus, 'is that which is acceptable to those 
over whom it is exercised." Vattel's Law of Nations, pp.' 
389 and 390. This learned writer adds: "Such are the 
rights which the law of nature gives the conqueror and the 
duties which it imposes on him." * * * "In general, he 
ought to consult the true interest of his own State, and by 
sound policy to reconcile them as far as possible with those 
of the conquered country." 

Here let it be observed that the same rule applies to a civil 
as to a foreign war. Says Vattel : " Whenever, therefore, a 
3 



34 

numerous body of men think they have a right to resist the 
sovereign^ and feel themselves in a condition to appeal to 
the sword, the war ought to be carried on by the contending 
parties in the same manner as by two different nations ; 
and they ought to leave open the same means for prevent- 
ing its being carried to outrageous extremities, and for the 
restoration of peace." " When the sovereign has subdued 
the opposite party, and reduced them to submit and sue for 
peace, he may except from the amnesty the authors or the 
disturbance," which implies necessarily that all others 
are entitled to amnesty. (Vattel's Law of Nations, p. 
425-6.) Finally, on this point it may well be asked whether 
it is becoming for us to follow the example of the Duke of 
Alva, of evil fame, in the extreme severity practiced by him 
towards the rebellious Netherlands, and to such extent as to 
leave them no hope but in victory, which they accordingly 
won, or that noble example of Henry the Great of Prance, 
in the hour of his triumph over his rebellious subjects, from 
whom he had suffered outrage and indignity — "Yet," says 
Vattel, " his victories were ever accompanied by a uniform 
clemency; and that excellent prince at length obtained the 
success he deserved; he gained a nation of faithful sub- 
jects ; WHEREAS THE DUKE OF ALVA CAUSED HIS MASTER TO 

lose the United Provinces." Vattel's Law of Nations, 
p. 422. 

To my mind it is clear as the sunlight, that we now hold in 
our hands the power to protract this war, drawing after it 
the most unhappy and disastrous results both to ourselves 
and to the enemy, or equally to bring it to a speedy and 
happy close. The one or the other will happen, as we shall 
observe the one or the other of two lines of policy open be- 
fore us. If we press them with harsh and extreme meas- 
ures — measures which reduce them to utter penury and 
want — measures which destroy the very germs of hope, we 
may rest assured, unless human nature belies herself and 
history be false, that we shall thereby add greater vigor to 
the rebellion than it has ever yet attained, and that thous- 
ands of millions of treasure and rivers of blood must be ex- 



35 , 

pended ill subduing it, and that, after it is subdued, large 
armies must be held in reserve to watch and keep down its 
new outbursts. But if, on the other hand, we give opera- 
tion to the trade policy of the Government, with all those 
attending and happy results which have been above demon- 
strated; if, at the moment our armies are winning victories 
in the field, our policy shall conquer the acquiescence of the 
people, draw them to us, make them interested in our early 
success \ then the war comes speedily to an end, to be fol- 
lowed by a solid and continuing peace, in which the people 
of the South much more perfectly, and on a much higher 
plane, because on the piane of freedom, will rapidly coalesce 
with us again, and bring back to the great Union an empire 
of States, thenceforward to be cemented with us in national 
unity, forming the one grand Eepublic whose destiny shall 
be upward and onward forever. 

Having demonstrated, as it is believed, that a properly 
regulated trade with the people of the revolted States, by us> 
is not opposed to the laws of war ; that it does not defeat the 
objects of the blockade ; that it does not violate or end it ; 
that it reinforces the war ; that it puts two hundred and 
seventy millions of dollars in the national treasury ; that it 
sustains our mills and enriches our people; that it creates 
an enormous balance of trade in our favor, and could not 
fail so powerfully to impress our finances as to lift our funds 
to par with gold ; that it demoralizes the rebellion and brings 
it to a speedy and happy termination— having demonstra- 
ted these points, it may well be inquired whether it were not 
wiser to repeal all that part of the act of July 2, 1864, which 
restrains this trade, and so to amend the act as to facilitate 
the trade policy of the Government, rather than by repeal- 
ing the 8th section of the act to destroy the trade altogether, 
and thus lose those splendid results which, it has been seen, 
must follow its successful prosecution. 



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